

Reframing the Border

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A Westphalian Imaginary

12.

Oil painting by the Dutch painter Gerard ter Borch (II) documenting the ratification of the Peace of Münster, one of the treaties concluded in Westphalia in 1648. The ratification of the treaty ended the Eighty Years' War between the United Netherlands and the Spanish Crown and formally established the independence of the Dutch Republic. The painting is presented in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam; on loan from the National Gallery, London, since 2000



As cultural producers from Europe, we experience the continent where we live as an ambiguous terrain; we cannot simply identify with it without accepting the consequences of such a positioning. Europe has a long tradition of dealing for itself. When the terms of the treaties of Westphalia were negotiated in the 17th century, it was Europeans sitting around the table and agreeing that the world would be made up of sovereign states. They were the ones who decided—for themselves and for all those who were not invited to the table—what was lawful and what was outside the law, who had the right to control territories and markets, and who had no rights whatsoever. Its systems are as regional as any other regional configuration of knowledge, but Europe has always understood them as universal and turned them into global designs.¹

¹ Nimako and Willemsen, “Transatlantic Slavery and the Rise of the European World Order”; Mignolo, “Geopolitics of sensing and knowing.”

Being artists from the Netherlands presents a specific ambivalence for us because, in our nation's history, the eminence of art is inextricably tied to colonialism. Colonial profits enabled the Dutch Golden Age with its "masters" who painted not for monarchies, aristocracies, or the church, but for the new art market. Such profits also financed our nation's war of independence against the Spanish Empire. It was the newly founded Dutch Republic that initiated and facilitated the emergence of the United East India Company, followed later by the West India Company. These forerunners of corporate-led globalization were involved in international trade and the overseas production of high value commodities such as sugar, tobacco, nutmeg, and cloves. They issued bonds and stock shares for individual buyers, thus recruiting citizens to the role of shareholder. The financial resources this generated enabled the further conquest of overseas territories and the construction of infrastructures to commercially exploit them. Meanwhile, savvy Dutch lawyers developed legal tools that granted the companies the right to operate as agents of the state. Such government letters provided legislative cover to loot ships, wage war, and install administrations in the conquered territories.² Many cities in the Netherlands still honor the officers who worked for these companies with statues and placards that celebrate the contribution of these naval heroes to our nation's struggle for independence and greatness. What is often left out of the story is how they participated in enslavement, slaughter and ecocide to achieve this.³

How, as two white Dutch artists, can we grapple with our inherited complicity in this tangle of colonial and postcolonial projects? How can we build upon our continent's aesthetic and cultural legacies without reproducing the mechanisms of exploitation on which these are founded? How can we—privileged with European citizenship—problematize its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion? Such questions have shaped our artistic practice. We embrace the notion that making images in and of the world entails our participation in shared events, as actors amongst other actors, both human and other-than-human. Art-making thus becomes for us an involvement in a world that is not there for us to fully grasp, but that we get to know a little better by interacting with it. Although we often work in a documentary style, we learned that there is no such thing as mere observation. As image-makers, we are always already part of the events that we record. We frame, we focus, we shape, we choose a point of view. Unwittingly, our presence may provoke certain voices to speak up and silence others. As a consequence, we came to understand our artistic practice as a form of participatory intervention.

2 Of these two companies, only the VOC had the right to deploy military troops. Minto-Coy and Berman, *Public Administration and Policy in the Caribbean*, 80.

3 The Indonesian Banda Islands, for example, were colonized in 1621 after a VOC-army lead by 'naval hero' Jan Pieterszoon Coen massacred almost the entire native population with the approval of the Dutch State, to secure the monopoly on the trade in nutmeg and mace. The VOC hired Japanese samurai torturers to behead tens of village chiefs. Coen was nicknamed the Slaughter of Banda. www.historiek.net/jan-pieterszoon-coen-1587-1629/5545/.

13.1 and 13.2

Stills from Grossraum (Borders of Europe) (2004/2005, 35 mm film), depicting smugglers throwing contraband over the border fence at the market in Ceuta



Borders of Europe

Working from Europe today means being situated in the dynamics of cultural and economic crises, shifting borders, growing divides, and red tape. Around 2003, we started to investigate this transforming Europe. At the time, the EU was on the verge of extending itself with ten new member states. It was not yet clear how the European project would develop. Would an expanded EU be able to confront transnational challenges such as migration or climate change? Or would it rather become a fortress, a privileged area where goods and people could move freely protected by fortified borders and tariff walls? Were the dismantling of national borders and the introduction of a single currency first steps leading to a federation? Or would Europe remain a patchwork of jurisdictions, a league of sovereign states? Perhaps the outside boundary would turn out to be a new Frontier: a wave of territorial expansion that would soon incorporate sizable countries such as Turkey and Ukraine. Such questions incited us to make *Grossraum (Borders of Europe)* (2004/2005): an installation consisting of a silent 35 mm film juxtaposed with a publication, documenting border crossings at the Polish-Ukrainian border, the Spanish-Moroccan border, and the Greek/Turkish Cypriot divide. We stationed our camera on hillsides and rooftops and filmed across Europe's border to its outside. Our camera-eye didn't adhere to the borderlines that were drawn on the map. Instead, we explored alternative trajectories. We followed a smuggler throwing contraband over a border fence, or descended through a forest—divided by a border, but nonetheless inseparably part of the same ecosystem.


Europe's borders were heavily guarded and photography was forbidden without the permission of proper authorities. A long trajectory of permission-seeking preceded our poetic border transgressions. The publication entitled *The Formal Trajectory* contained a selection of correspondence with local contacts and authorities, and a logbook of our experiences on location. In revealing these negotiations and the circumstances surrounding the recordings, the publication makes evident that our artistic freedom to optically trespass was regulated by an invisible juridical structure.

The making of *Grossraum* taught us that bilateral ties shape Europe's relation to its outside. For example, when we asked Polish authorities for permission to film their border with Ukraine, they requested that we also contact the Ukrainian authorities for their approval. And although the Polish request confused the Ukrainian authorities—how could they give us a Ukrainian press card, if we would not set foot on Ukrainian soil?—they displayed a similar prudence with regards to their Polish colleagues. Only 60 years ago, the western part of what is now Ukraine used to be Polish territory. The border between the two countries still divides many families. This was one of the reasons that the Polish government had been reluctant to comply with Europe's visa requirements and strongly advocated for more favorable conditions for its eastern neighbor. It resulted first in cheaper and simplified access to European visas for Ukrainians, and eventually, in an agreement that allowed Ukrainians to travel within Europe visa free.⁴

4 The Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland informed us by email on April 16, 2019 that Ukraine has been the beneficiary of an agreement between Ukraine and European Union with regard to Schengen visas since 2008, which set out special facilitations for Ukrainian citizens related to fees for processing visa applications (35 euro), timeframes for processing visa applications (10 days in regular cases and 2 day in cases of urgent character) and simplified procedures. Since June 11,

14.

Letter and film still as reproduced in the publication, The Formal Trajectory (2004/2005)



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2017, Ukrainian citizens can travel visa-free within all member states of the EU with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland.

That not all countries enjoy such good relations with their neighbors became clear to us when Moroccan authorities refused to give us permission to film its border with Spain at Ceuta. Morocco considered the Spanish enclave on the Northern point of Africa as *occupied* by Spain, and therefore did not recognize the border as legitimate. Reading between the lines, however, we understood that we could film the boundary if we had permission from Spanish authorities.

The *Guardia Civil*—whose headquarters were located in the Spanish capital Madrid—guarded the frontier itself. But there were also port authorities, customs, and the local police of the autonomous district of Ceuta. It required a considerable amount of asking around to find out which authority was responsible for what, and in what order we had to approach them. We spoke to many officers who all gave us their consent, but never received a single document. When we asked the final officer how we could prove without papers that we had permission to film the borderland, he advised us to memorize the names of everyone we had encountered, and to list them orally in case we were held up; a directive that surprisingly turned out to work.

Though the border fences at Ceuta had not yet been stormed, irregular migration was already leaving traces in the landscape. We found rubber ammunition and improvised wooden ladders: remnants of nocturnal encounters between Spanish border patrols and African migrants climbing the fence in an attempt to reach Europe.

The Cyprus divide turned out to be an even more contested boundary. In 1974, Greek Cypriot nationalists supported by elements of the Greek military junta staged a *coup d'état* in an attempt to incorporate Cyprus into Greece. To protect the Turkish Cypriot minority that lived on the island, the Turkish army invaded Cyprus, occupied its northern part, and never left. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared itself independent in 1983 with Turkey alone recognizing the new state. For decades, a UN buffer zone has separated the two parts of the island. As a result, only half of Cyprus was able to enter the European Union in 2004.

After considerable negotiation, the government of Cyprus gave us permission to film the divide on the condition that we always be accompanied by Greek Cypriot soldiers.⁵ But a dilemma arose when we wanted to film inside the buffer zone. According to UN regulations, the Greek Cypriot soldiers were not allowed to enter. The recruits nonetheless had orders from their superiors to escort us. After calling back and forth, the Greek Cypriot soldiers were told that they could accompany us provided that they exchanged their uniforms for plain clothes. Filming in the presence of two groups of soldiers was by no means easy. They watched continuously over our shoulders to make sure that nothing came into our picture frame that could give the impression of partiality in the conflict. Since the landscape was fraught with flags and monuments, this made it almost impossible to compose a shot. Only around noon, as imams started to bellow from the minarets, and a UN soldier began to talk about his recent employment in Baghdad, did the monitoring ease. By nightfall, the soldiers were chatting animatedly about the latest news, and the boring and expensive nightlife in Nicosia, allowing us to explore the landscape a bit more freely.

5 Another condition for their collaboration was that the title of the film would not be *Borders of Europe*, since the government of Cyprus did not recognize the divide as a legitimate border.

15.1 and 15.2

Stills from Grossraum (Borders of Europe) (2004/2005, 35 mm film), depicting the UN buffer zone in Cyprus



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In retrospect, the whole process of seeking permission and negotiating with border patrols and state officials took place in a remarkably friendly atmosphere. It may have been indicative of positive expectations of the newly expanded Europe. But it soon became clear that the shifting border also caused political turmoil. When the presidential elections in Ukraine turned out to be manipulated in favor of the pro-Russian candidate, tensions surfaced between pro-European and pro-Russian parts of the population.⁶ The struggle over direction eventually led to several armed conflicts, in which separatists supported by the Russian army attempted to divide Ukraine into pro-Russian and pro-European parts.⁷

Also within the European territory, ruptures revealed that support for the European project was waning. Only a year after the expansion, French and Dutch citizens voted against the European Constitution. Romania and Bulgaria were admitted into the EU in 2007, but several member-states applied limitations with regard to the free movement of these countries' workers.⁸ A year later, the financial crisis laid bare that the EU was no longer able to deliver on its promise to increase prosperity. Eurosceptic political movements from the far-right surged and Europe found itself struggling to stay united. Would authorities have been open to an artistic project that aimed to frame Europe's borders had we sought their permission a few years later?

Eluding trade barriers

On May 4, 2004—the day that the EU extended its borders with ten new member states—we stationed our camera on a hillside along the Polish-Ukrainian border. Our aim was to document how this national border would transform into an external border of a refigured Europe. While we observed the growing queue of cars, a farmer greeted us with sausages and coffee. When he handed us the sugar, he told us that the Polish *cukier* had become twice as sweet since Poland entered the European Union: the price had multiplied from one day to the next. As a result, Polish sugar was now even cheaper in the Ukraine than in Poland itself.

The farmer's remark incited us to investigate Europe's sugar market. We discovered that Europe's beet sugar industry had relied on political protection from the start. Beet sugar had not been able to compete with cane sugar imported from the colonies, where it was produced through the slavery system. A beet sugar industry came into existence in Europe only when, at the beginning of the 19th century, the English and the French set up trade blockades in their struggle for colonial hegemony. With Napoleon's financial support, sugar refineries were built all over Europe.

At the time we investigated Europe's sugar politics, the EU still provided financial support to its beet sugar industry. The internal sugar market was consolidated with a

6 The pro-European candidate won the elections after a revote, but tensions remained as one short-lived government after another attempted to reconcile the conflicting objectives of maintaining good relations with Russia and implementing reforms to meet Europe's requirements for collaboration. Larra-
bee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe."

7 The tensions culminated in 2014 in the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula.

8 Some European countries feared that the admittance of Bulgaria and Romania would set in motion an exodus of workers to other member states and would disrupt labor markets.

16.1 and 16.2

Still from Monument of Sugar—how to use artistic means to elude trade barriers (2007, 16 mm film), depicting the production of a sugar block from European beet sugar respectively ...



... depicting a ship unloading raw sugar bulk in the port of Lagos, filmed from the Dangote sugar refinery



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so-called *intervention price*: a minimum selling price, which was substantially higher than what was offered on the world market. A financial instrument called *export restitution* made the expensive beet sugar competitive and allowed European sugar producers to dump their surplus sugar outside Europe. Meanwhile sugar imports were taxed heavily, to keep out foreign competitors. This elaborate system caused the price difference that the Polish farmer had observed.⁹

Trade statistics suggested that the majority of Europe's sugar exports were sold to Nigeria. With the aim of reversing Europe's sugar flow, we travelled to Lagos. We planned to purchase Europe's sugar cheaply on Nigeria's market, to transform the sweet crystals *in situ* into sculptural blocks, and to ship these back to Europe. Transforming the sugar into an artwork would allow us to submit our import application in Europe under the commodity code 9703, which applies to all monuments and original artworks regardless of the material in which they are produced.

The silent 16 mm film *Monument of Sugar - how to use artistic means to elude trade barriers* evaluates the project in scrolling titles alternated with documentary sequences showing the production of sugar and the making of the monument. The film essay also chronicles how our conceptual framework crumbled. We could find no trace on Nigeria's market of the large flows of European beet sugar that the data had suggested, but only found cane sugar imported from Brazil. Much to our surprise, sugar was by no means cheap. The high earnings generated from the export of oil had led to the overvaluation of the Nigerian *naira*, making it cheaper to import commodities than to produce them. To stimulate local production, the Nigerian government imposed levies on all foreign goods, including sugar. We had also not foreseen that exporting our sugar monument out of Nigeria would make it subject to a Nigerian regulation created to stop the exodus of antiques and other art treasures. After import levies, profit margins, and export permit, the Nigerian sugar blocks turned out to be even more expensive than sugar blocks made in Europe.

Tokens of Friendship


The *Lomé Convention* regulates the trade of sugar and other commodities between Europe and so-called ACP countries (formerly colonized countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific). When this convention came up for revision in 2000, the EU demanded the insertion of a clause that required ACP countries to “accept the return and readmission of any of its nationals illegally present in EU territory.” The new agreement—now called the *Cotonou Agreement* after the city in Benin where the treaty was signed—also obligated the ACP countries to discourage undocumented migration, as well as to facilitate the work of European administrators tasked with evaluating asylum and immigration claims before would-be migrants departed for Europe.¹⁰ Thus, while the treaty was nominally conceived to stimulate sustainable development, it ultimately only provided this support on the condition that the beneficiary countries became agents in Europe's border defense regime.

9 Since 2006, Europe reorganized its sugar market to reduce overproduction, causing many sugar beet farmers to shift to other crops and beet sugar factories to shut their doors.

10 Bialasiewicz, “Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of Europe.”

17.

Installation view of Monument of Sugar as exhibited at Argos, Brussels (2007)



More treaties followed that hid in their terms that they were instruments in the fortification of Europe's outside borders. In August 2008, the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and the Libyan Colonel Gaddafi signed the *Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation* to settle long-running disputes between the two countries, such as Libya's demands for reparations for the damages caused by colonialism, and claims from Italian companies that work carried out in Libya had never been paid for. The disputes were resolved with the agreement that Italy would reimburse five billion euros to Libya over a period of twenty years. The sum would be recuperated from tax revenues, which Italy would collect on profits made by Italian companies operating in Libya. At the occasion of the treaty's signing, Italy also returned the Venus of Cyrene, a statue that had been looted from Libya during the colonial period.¹¹ According to Berlusconi, the sculpture's restitution and the *Friendship Treaty* were "a complete and moral acknowledgement of the damage inflicted on Libya by Italy during the colonial era."¹²

The treaty, however, not only mended old wounds with the help of an ancient artwork and future business opportunities, it also made provisions for bilateral efforts to tighten the control of Libya's coast, its waters, and its terrestrial borders. Both countries agreed in the treaty to combat undocumented migration with the help of patrol boats and a satellite detection system. Libya also consented to the disembarkation on its soil of migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea by Italian vessels.¹³

To most Europeans, these first signs that Europe was outsourcing its border protection by means of treaty-making went largely unnoticed. We, too, were absorbed by other issues, such as the sudden rise of conservative nationalism, the growing resistance against migrants, and increased Islamophobia. In the same year that Italy signed the Friendship Treaty with Libya and restituted the Venus of Cyrene, we started the art project *Monument to Another Man's Fatherland*, which delved into Europe's roots of imperial cultural politics. Its point of departure was the Pergamon Altar—a monument that is nowadays the property of Berlin's State Museums, but was in ancient times constructed in what is present-day Turkey to celebrate a victory of Greek colonizers over migrating Celts. Our plan was to make a film installation that would address the expatriation of the monument and its appropriation for nation-building.¹⁴ Since Berlin hosts a large community of Turkish migrants, we wanted to do this by layering the monument's 19th century relocation on contemporary migration.

At the time, many European countries had launched compulsory integration programs in response to reports of migrant integration "lagging behind" expectations. Such programs not only included language classes but also civic courses aimed at familiarizing immigrants with the receiving country's norms, history, values and cul-

11 The headless statue of the *Venus of Cyrene* was originally located in the town of Cyrene, part of an ancient Greek colony in Hellenistic times more than 2 millennia ago. It was taken by Italian troops in 1915 for display in Rome. Chechi, Bandle, and Renold, "Case Venus of Cyrene—Italy and Libya."

12 "Italy seals Libya colonial deal."

13 Bialasiewicz, "Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of EUrope" and Ronzitti, "The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?"

14 The State Museums in Berlin had been one of the signatories of the *Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums* (2002) which defended western museums policy to not retribute foreign artifacts to the countries of origin, even if the items were obtained under dubious circumstances.

tural traditions.¹⁵ For our restaged version of the monument, we invited young Turkish men and women who were participating in an integration program at the Goethe Institute in Istanbul to describe before the camera in their fledgling German the mythical battle between Greek gods and giants that is depicted on the Pergamon Altar's frieze. The film was countered by a second film, which silently scanned the sculpted battle scene.

Because the Berlin State Museums repudiated our request to make film recordings in the museum with the comment that “the project might stir the debate about repatriation, something we are not interested in,” we reconstructed the altar's frieze from images that we found in books, and instead of the sculpted relief, filmed the photomontage. The process of tracing images for the collage revealed that the altar had been used over and over again both as a means of political bond-making and as a locus of cultural appropriation and exchange. For instance, we found one study that analyzed Pergamon's building style and appropriation of Greek mythology as propaganda to present the colony as genuinely Greek. Other books disclosed how the altar's frieze had been confiscated by Stalin's Red Army and brought to Leningrad as war booty, to be returned to Berlin in 1958 as “a token of friendship between the GDR and the USSR.”

We were reminded once more of the entanglement of colonialism, migration, and art when in January 2019 a massive migration was announced, not of people traveling to Europe, but of art treasures crossing Europe's borders in the opposite direction: a massive relocation of things. French president Macron issued a statement that France was willing to return all art treasures ill-gotten during the colonial period to their countries of origin. He based his statement on a report—which he had commissioned himself—on the status of African objects in French museums. The report called for the prompt restitution of objects taken by force or acquired under unfair conditions, including items recovered during scientific missions prior to 1960, and “forgotten” objects—objects which had been lent by African institutions to French museums for the purpose of exhibition or restoration and never returned.¹⁶ Because the French law of inalienability forbids the ceding of cultural heritage from public collections, the report proposed to amend the law. In line with these recommendations, the French president decided that, without further delay, twenty-six sculptures in the collection of the Musée du Quai Branly would be returned to Benin. The artefacts were spoils of war, pilfered by the French army after a historical battle at the end of the 19th century against the Kingdom of Dahomey. That these objects still sparked the African imagination became evident when, in 2006, some of them were exhibited in Cotonou, attracting hundreds of thousands of visitors—the same Cotonou where six years earlier the ACP countries had signed the treaty that turned them into partners in Europe's border regime.¹⁷

15 Carrera, “A Comparison of Integration Programmes in the EU.”

16 The report was commissioned by Macron himself, and written by art-historian Bénédicte Savoy of France and scholar, writer and musician Felwine Sarr of Senegal. “Culture: un film sénégalais cofinancé par la Côte d'Ivoire au Festival de Cannes.”

17 The exhibition marked one hundred years since the death of King Behanzin who had led the resistance against the French colonial troops.

18.1 and 18.2

Stills from Monument to Another Man's Fatherland:

Revolt of the Giants—recited by prospective Germans (2009, 16 mm film)



18.3

Still from Monument to Another Man's Fatherland:

Revolt of the Giants—reconstructed from reproductions (2009, 35 mm film)



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Will the French restitution of art treasures again be merely an instrument for European politics? A diversion to deflect anger over French immigration policy and the presence of French troops in West Africa? A form of leverage in ongoing negotiations over halting migration and securing access to resources?¹⁸ Or could the shipping back of old artworks be a sign that Europe is finally prepared to reinvent its relation to what it imagines as its outside?

New deal

How would we frame Europe's outline today? Although migration is often discussed as a European "crisis," countries in the Middle East and Africa host the most displaced persons. What most distinguishes Europe from these countries is its struggle to reconcile irregular migration with its self-image of being a neatly bounded, well-governed polity.¹⁹ This image of regulatory competence seems to pivot on Europe's perceived effectiveness in controlling the flows of goods, property, ideas, and artworks into and out of its markets. We encountered Europe's complex regime of trade regulations during our research for *Monument of Sugar*.²⁰ But it is not only import levies that regulate Europe's market. Any company that makes or sells products within the European Union must comply with regulatory standards that pertain to food hygiene, traceability, environmental impact, competitiveness, and consumer privacy. The European Union applies, for example, a zero-tolerance policy to the presence of unauthorized biotech products in food and feed; it has strict directives with regard to the use of recyclable packaging; and it does not allow the testing of cosmetics on animals. Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (regulating the use of personal data by companies operating in the EU) and its Competition Law (restraining the anti-competitive conduct of companies) were able to restrain technology giants.²¹ Market directives, regulations and other acts have thus enabled Europe to distribute its values and norms far beyond its territory.²²

Regulating flows of services and things is however quite different from regulating flows of people. Persistent conflicts and atrocities in (among other nations) Syria, Afghanistan, and Eritrea caused large numbers of people to leave their country and seek refuge elsewhere. This resulted in a steep increase in the number of refugees traveling to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. The term "migrant crisis" came into use in April 2015, when five boats sank with a combined death toll estimated at more than 1,200 people.²³ Due to the mass influx of people, government institutions in the EU

18 Nourhussen, "Macron vergat neokolonialisme."

19 Walters, "Imagined Migration World."

20 The same tariff barrier that incited us to make a monument of sugar to elude Europe's trade barrier for sugar imports, motivated the UK's largest sugar importer Tate & Lyle (founder of the Tate museums) to advocate for leaving the EU. During the Brexit campaign, images of Tate & Lyle's heaps of cane sugar came to illustrate the mountainous gains when the UK would liberate itself from the "tyranny" of European trade regulations and would finally be able to pursue unrestricted free trade. Roberts, "Sweet Brexit."

21 European Commission Help Desk, "Trade Regime and General Product Safety"; de Gruyter, "Europa moet leren 'machtsdenken'."

22 European Union, "Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts"

23 European Regional Development Fund, "Interreg response to migration-related challenges."

responsible for the task of managing irregular migration became overloaded. To curb such ‘un-European’ disorder, the European Union concluded a whole range of treaties designed for the sole purpose of externalizing the control of its border. In 2016, a first deal to tackle the migrant crisis was brokered with Turkey. In exchange for six billion euros to support refugee shelters on its territory, Turkey committed to better guarding its borders and coastlines and to stop migrants sailing to Greece. In return, Turkey demanded that discussions on its membership in the European Union be sped up, and that visa requirements for Turkish citizens entering the EU be waived. The deal caused great division within the Union. Cyprus refused to talk about Turkish membership until the Turkish occupation of half its territory had been resolved. But also, How could Europe stand up for values such as democracy, equality, freedom of expression, or human rights, if it outsourced its border security to a state that increasingly violated these values? What values did Europe actually represent?

In 2013, Morocco became the first country in the Mediterranean area to sign a Mobility Agreement with the European Union that includes an objective to “combat illegal immigration.” It also endorsed deals on immigration with individual EU countries, particularly with Spain. To comply with the task of halting undocumented migration to Europe, Moroccan authorities often arbitrarily arrest migrants during raids, and deport them to remote areas.²⁴ But like Turkey, Morocco also uses its contribution to Europe’s border protection as leverage in other negotiations, such as its claim to the Western Sahara. After colonial Spain left North Africa, the Polisario Front and Morocco battled to get control of Western Sahara until a ceasefire was agreed upon in 1991. The area has been disputed territory ever since. In 2016, the European Court of Justice ruled that trade agreements between the European Union and Morocco could therefore not include products from this region. Since the ruling, Morocco seems less motivated to guard Europe’s border. With growing flows of migrants, it tries to pressure the EU to support its claim to the Western Sahara, or at least turn a blind eye to products coming from this region.²⁵

Although outsourcing borderwork has turned out to be a sticky wicket for Europe, more treaties have followed. Italy, for instance, has reactivated its *Friendship Treaty* with Libya after suspending it during the Arab Spring. Libya also received substantial funding from Europe for “managing mixed migration flows”—EU jargon for distinguishing refugees from other migrants—and for “improving migration management”—which includes the repatriation of migrants, border surveillance, and improving the conditions in immigration detention centers.²⁶ Because it was not easy to do business with a fragmented Libya ravaged by years of civil war, Europe also began making agreements with countries deeper into the African continent.²⁷ Niger, for example, is one of the countries through which migrants from Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Benin pass on their way to Libya. With European funding, Niger’s border

24 Alami, “Morocco Unleashes a Harsh Crackdown on Sub-Saharan Migrants.”

25 Nielsen, “Investigation exposed;” Bolongard, “Morocco offers fish for land;” European Commission, “Migration and mobility partnership signed between the EU and Morocco.”

26 Grün, “Follow the money.”

27 Since its founding in 2015, the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa—aimed at “addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa”—pledged over four billion euros in ‘partnerships’ with 26 African countries. European Commission, “EU Emergency Trust Funds for Africa.”

19.

Still from Grossraum (Borders of Europe), (2004/2005, 35 mm film), depicting the flag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in painted pebbles



surveillance regime was tightened, human traffickers were put behind bars, pick-up trucks (used to transport migrants through the desert) were confiscated, and new legislation was adopted prohibiting the transportation of undocumented migrants. Europe even started a re-employment project for the more than 6,000 Nigerians who had been working in the migrant industry and had become jobless due to the measures.

Sudan is also a transit country for migrants on their way to Libya. Eritreans, Ethiopians, Chadians, Somalis and even Syrians travel through it. Sudan's President al-Bashir was the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for masterminding and implementing a plan during the war in Darfur to destroy the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa populations.²⁸ Nevertheless, many European countries strengthened their diplomatic ties with Sudan during al-Bashir's dictatorship and the European Union released more than 150,000,000 euros for the training and gearing up of the Sudanese border police.²⁹

Such partnerships brought Europe into troubled waters with regards to human rights and international law.³⁰ Media frequently report of migrants being either abused by the law enforcement officers of contracted governments or stranded in overrun processing camps under the remit of the partner countries, where they are vulnerable to robbery, rape or even to being sold off as enslaved laborers.

Europe's new "migration deals," "friendship treaties," and "mobility agreements" do not seem so different from the treaties of Westphalia, which for centuries have shaped the identity of Europe and secured its hegemony. In the process, the new treaties distribute European priorities such as strong borders to Niger, Turkey, and elsewhere.

Where would we have stationed our camera if we wanted to document Europe's boundaries today? Would we have filmed in a refugee camp in Turkey, funded by the EU? Would we place the camera at the border between Nigeria and Niger, where road signs adorned with EU logos inform travelers that "Illegal transportation of migrants exposes you to a fine of 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 CFA Franc?"³¹ Would we try to retrieve images from the European satellite detection system that scours the Saharan dust road between Sudan and Libya? Or would we seek permission to film at Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris where once-looted artworks are loaded into airplanes to be returned to their countries of origin? One thing seems certain: Europe is no longer the only party sitting at the negotiation table, and its mandate is no longer the bedrock for the dialogue. The continent is requested to deliver on its oft-repeated promise of a partnership of equals.

28 "Omar al-Bashir."

29 Vermeulen and de Korte, "Gewapend met migratiecijfers gooien we onze grenzen dicht," van Dijken and Suleiman, "De weg naar Europa loopt via Soedan;" Chandler, Khartoum, "Inside the EU's flawed \$200 million migration deal with Sudan."

30 "Escape from Libya." This article appeared in the Middle East and Africa section of the print edition under the headline "Homeward bound."

31 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, "Transporter illégalement des migrants vous expose à une peine d'amende de 1.000.000 à 3.000.000 F CFA." A picture of the road shield is depicted with the article "Commission praises progress under EU Partnership Framework—human rights organisations raise concern." As of March 2019, the exchange rate is €1 = 655 CFA Francs.